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Abstract
Many cultural traits exhibit volatile dynamics, commonly dubbed fashions or fads. Here we show that realistic fashion-like
dynamics emerge spontaneously if individuals can copy others’ preferences for cultural traits as well as traits themselves. We
demonstrate this dynamics in simple mathematical models of the diffusion, and subsequent abandonment, of a single
cultural trait which individuals may or may not prefer. We then simulate the coevolution between many cultural traits and
the associated preferences, reproducing power-law frequency distributions of cultural traits (most traits are adopted by few
individuals for a short time, and very few by many for a long time), as well as correlations between the rate of increase and
the rate of decrease of traits (traits that increase rapidly in popularity are also abandoned quickly and vice versa). We also
establish that alternative theories, that fashions result from individuals signaling their social status, or from individuals
randomly copying each other, do not satisfactorily reproduce these empirical observations.
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While the neutral model provides a powerful starting point to
study cultural change [4,18], there are many reasons to believe
that fashions are not driven by random choices. Individuals
express strong positive and negative preferences for cultural traits,
and prefer to copy some models rather than others [19–21]. Status
models recognize these factors, at the cost of postulating that highstatus individuals are anti-conformist while everyone else is
conformist. Status models also postulate a given subdivision
between high- and low-status individuals. A model that could
explain why some individuals have higher status would yield
greater insight into fashion dynamics.
We present here an alternative model of fashion and fads that
builds on our previous work on the effects of repeated cultural
transmission on the frequency of cultural traits [22–24]. We study
the possibility that fashions and fads arise because individuals can
copy each other’s preferences for cultural traits, in addition to the
traits themselves. We call this the ‘‘preference model’’ of fashion.
Because preferences determine which traits appear most attractive
to individuals, they act as ‘‘regulatory’’ traits in the sense that are
both socially learned and influence the outcome of social learning.
This highlights an important difference between cultural and
genetic evolution: in the former the rules of transmission (e.g.,
whether to copy or not) may be modified by the cultural process
itself [22–25].
We first consider the coevolution of one cultural trait and the
preference for such trait, showing that the the repeated cultural
transmission of trait and preference is enough to generate a fashion
cycle in which the trait first becomes popular and then disappears
from the population. We then consider the simultaneous
coevolution of many trait-preference pairs, showing that cultural
transmission alone produces fashion dynamics exhibiting two key
properties of actual fashion cycles: the power-law distribution of
frequency of cultural variants mentioned above, and the finding

Introduction
While some cultural traits, once introduced in a population,
tend to become to varying degrees stable part of the cultural
repertoire of that population, others exhibit peculiar volatile
dynamics, commonly dubbed fads or fashions. Well documented
examples are as diverse as skirt lengths [1], pop songs [2], first
names [3–5], dog breeds [6], pottery decorations in the
archaeological record [7], and keywords in academics vocabulary
[8]. Such fluctuations in popularity are not mainly due to intrinsic
characteristics of the traits–there seems to be nothing intrinsically
advantageous about, say, wearing purple one year but not the
next–but they are likely to reflect forces that are internal to cultural
dynamics.
Since at least the 18th century, fashions have been considered a
product of social stratification [9–13]. According to such ‘‘status’’
models, a fashion arises because individuals of low social status copy
those of perceived high status. When a trait becomes popular,
however, high-status individuals quickly abandon the trait to
differentiate themselves from low-status individuals. As a consequence, low-status individuals abandon the traits too, bringing the
fashion cycle to an end (for recent computational models see [14–16]).
Recently, however, a ‘‘neutral’’ model of cultural change [4] has
been proposed as a more parsimonious explanation of fashions. In
such a model fashions arise as by-products of individuals copying
each other randomly (akin to changes in allele frequency in neutral
genetic evolution [17]). The main appeal of this model is its
simplicity, and the fact that it reproduces realistic turnover rates as
well as empirical frequency distributions of cultural traits in several
domains. These distributions closely approximate power-law or
log-normal curves [2,4,8], meaning that only very few cultural
traits become very common, while the vast majority remains rare
(Figure 1A).
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 1. Empirical findings on fashion cycles. (A) Frequency distributions of cultural traits often follow power-law or log-normal distributions,
i.e., the vast majority of traits remains very rare, while a small minority become very popular. Crosses: Number of times a foreign author has been
translated into English (with permission from UNESCO’s Index Translationum) [38]. Closed circles: number of times a first name has been given to a
newborn in the U.S.A., 1880–2006 [32]. Open circles: number of dogs of 154 breeds registered with the American Kennel Club, 1926–2005 (courtesy of
H. Herzog) [6]. (B) Correlation between the rates of increase and decrease in the popularity of U.S.A. first names (Pearson’s r~0:82, pv10{10 , N~339,
only names reaching a frequency of at least 0.1% are included, see [5,32]) and dog breeds (Pearson’s r~0:53, pv10{4 , N~55).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g001

Our aim is to track the frequency of the four cultural types 0, P,
T, and PT over time to understand the cultural dynamics generated
by our assumptions. Taking into account all possible transitions
between types (e.g., a 0 observer who meets a T model becomes T
with probability u), we arrive at the following equations (see Model
S1, Figure S1, S2, S3, and Table S1 for details):

that cultural traits that increase rapidly in popularity are also
abandoned quickly, while slow increase in popularity correlates
with slow decrease. This has been shown for first names in the
U.S. and France [5], and here we report that it also holds for the
popularity of dog breeds, based on an analysis of data on dogs of
154 breeds registered with the American Kennel Club, 1926–2005
(Figure 1B). Lastly, we show that the neither the neutral model of
cultural change, nor models based on status can account for the
same breadth of empirical data.

x_ 0 ~(v{u)x0 xT {2u(1{u)x0 xPT z½w(1{w)zu(1{u)xP xT ð1Þ


x_ P ~{(w{u)xP xPT { 1{u2 {(1{w)2 xT xP

Methods
Model 1: One cultural trait

z2u(1{u)x0 xPT

Our core idea is that preferences for cultural traits, besides
influencing the adoption and abandonment of traits, are themselves
cultural traits that can be adopted or abandoned through social
learning. We start exploring this idea modeling the coevolution of
one cultural trait and the preference for such trait. Individuals can
be of one of four types: 0, lacking both trait and preference; T,
possessing the trait only; P, possessing the preference only; PT,
possessing both. Individuals meet randomly in pairwise social
interactions in which one individual (the observer) may copy another
(the model). The trait and the preference may be copied
independently of each other. The probability that copying occurs
between any two cultural types is u, apart in the following cases:

N

N

x_ T ~(w{u)xT xPT {(v{u)xT x0 z2u(1{u)x0 xPT


{ 1{w2 {(1{u)2 xT xP

x_ PT ~(w{u)xPT ðxP {xT Þ{2u(1{u)x0 xPT
z½w(1{w)zu(1{u)xP xT

ð3Þ

ð4Þ

where xi is the frequency of type i, and x_ i its rate of change
(derivative). We now study the cultural dynamics emerging from
these equations and relate it to the empirical findings considered
above. We consider a generic initial condition in which all types
have nonzero frequency. We note from the outset that the frequency
of the preference can never increase. Indeed, writing such frequency
as g~xP zxPT and summing equations (2) and (4), we obtain

When the model has the trait, an observer with the preference
is more likely to copy the model than an observer without the
preference. We thus assume that copying between P observers
and T or PT models, and between PT observers and T
models, occurs with increased probability wwu.
Copying between T observers and 0 models occurs with
increased probability vwu, meaning that individuals with the
trait, but without the preference, have a higher probability of
abandoning the trait upon meeting individuals with neither
trait nor preference.

g_ ~{(w{u)gxT

ð5Þ

which is always negative so long as xT w0 and gw0. Thus this
model cannot explain how a population comes to prefer a given
cultural trait. We address how this can happen later in the paper.
Here we study cultural dynamics assuming that the preference has
reached a frequency g(0)w0 (see also Model S1).

Note that copying may result in the observer abandoning the
trait or preference, if these are absent in the model.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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preference, meet individuals without trait nor preference. In the
first kind of encounters trait frequency increases with probability
w{u, while in the second kind of encounters trait frequency
decreases with probability v{u. We show in Model S1 that a
fashion cycle occurs provided the initial frequency g(0) is higher
than a threshold value (graphed in Figure 2A), which is a function
of the combination of system parameters given by

Equations (1–4) imply that the trait eventually disappears, while
the preference may persist at a very low frequency (see Model S1).
Fashion cycles are possible, however, because trait frequency can
increase for some time before starting to drop. Let f ~xT zxPT be
the frequency of the trait in the population. Its dynamics, obtained
summing equations (3) and (4), is
f_ ~(w{u)xP f {(v{u)x0 xT

ð6Þ
w~

Hence trait frequency increases as long as
(w{u)xP f w(v{u)x0 xT

w{u
v{u

ð8Þ

If the initial preference is lower than the threshold, trait frequency
steadily decreases without showing the rise-and-fall pattern
characteristic of fashion cycles. The initial frequency of the trait
plays no role in determining the success of the trait: even a trait
that is introduced at a high frequency (e.g., through promotional
sales or other marketing strategies) will disappear quickly unless it
is preferred by sufficiently many individuals.

ð7Þ

This condition is easily understood noting that, on the l.h.s., xP f is
the rate at which individuals with the preference, and lacking the
trait, meet individuals with the trait, while, on the r.h.s., xT x0 is
the rate at which individuals with the trait, and lacking the

Figure 2. Characteristics of fashion cycles generated by Model 1 (equations 1–4). (A) Minimum initial frequency, g(0) necessary to start a
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
w{u
1
~w. The curve has equation gmin (0)~1z w(1{ 1{4=w) (Model S1). (B) Example of
fashion cycle for system parameters u, v, w such that
v{u
2
fashion cycle starting from initial preference frequency g(0)~0:75 and initial trait frequency f (0)~0:05, with parameters u~0:1, v~0:15, w~0:3. (C)
Correlation between rate of increase and decrease of traits. (D) Duration of fashion cycles. The initial frequency of the preference interacts nonlinearly with system parameters: only when w is high very long cycles can occur, given a high initial preference. Maximum trait frequency is
approximately proportional to the initial preference, and does not depend strongly on w (Figure S4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g002
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becoming T rather than vice-versa, leading to the eventual
disappearance of the preference from the population
(Figure 3C, and dotted line in Figure 2B).
4. Once the preference has disappeared, the trait tends to
disappear, too, because individuals with the trait (both T and
PT) are no longer copied, and because T individuals
eventually relinquish the trait upon meeting 0 individuals
(Figure 3D).

Figure 2B shows an example of the dynamics generated by this
model, assuming that the frequency of the trait is initially low,
f (0)~0:05, and that the preference is initially high, g(0)~0:75.
As anticipated, the preference steadily decreases, while the trait
exhibits a cycle of initial diffusion and eventual abandonment. The
cycle results from the superposition of two cycles, first involving the
growth and decline of cultural type xPT and then of type xT .
When a cycle occurs, we observe a strong correlation between the
rate of increase in trait frequency and the rate of subsequent
decrease (Figure 2C), mirroring empirical observations (Figure 1B).
The dynamics of Model 1 (Figure 2B) suggests a theory of the
fashion cycle as composed of four phases (Figure 3):

The somewhat surprising shift in the dynamics in phase 3, that
explains how a fashion begins to fade, has been studied in previous
work exploring what makes an individual an effective cultural
model, i.e., someone who significantly influences others [22–24].
The basic idea is that, when a cultural trait is common, individuals
with a low preference for the trait are favored as cultural models
because they are less likely to copy others, and thus they display to
observers a stable set of traits that can be transmitted repeatedly
(see also [25,26]). In line with this logic, T individuals increase in
frequency at the expense of PT individuals, when then the latter
are common, because the PT type is more likely to copy the T
type than vice-versa.
The correlation between rates of increase and decrease of trait
frequency arises because the speed at which the successive phases
of the fashion cycle unfold is largely determined by the initial
frequency of the preference. The key observation is that
transformations between cultural types occur at rates proportional
to the abundance of the cultural types themselves. Thus a large
initial preference produces quickly relatively many PT individuals,

1. The preference for a trait arises in the population (Figure 3A).
As already mentioned, this phase is not captured by the model
above, and is studied later in the paper.
2. If the preference becomes sufficiently common, the trait itself
starts to spread and PT individuals, possessing both the
preference and the trait, increase in frequency as the many P
individuals meet the few T individuals (Figure 3B, and dashed
line in Figure 2B). The reason is that, when the preference is
common, T individuals are more effective cultural models than
P individuals, i.e., encounters between these two types result in
a net flow of P into PT. The magnitude of such flow is
regulated by the difference w{u in our model.
3. When PT individuals become common, the situation changes
as T individuals gain an advantage in social interactions.
Interactions between T and PT, in fact, favors PT individuals

Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the phases of the fashion cycle of a cultural trait.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g003
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as there are many P observer who can adopt the trait from T and
PT models (transition from phase 2 to phase 3 in Figure 3, or
dashed blue line in Figure 2B). As P individuals turn quickly into
PT, transitions from PT to T increase in frequency and quickly
convert PT into T individuals (transition from phase 3 to phase 4
in Figure 3, or dotted blue line in Figure 2B), which eventually
leads to the abandonment of the trait. When the initial preference
is lower, all these processes occur more slowly because the level
reached by the variables xP , xPT , and xT is lower.
In conclusion, this simple model shows that the cultural
transmission of traits and preferences is sufficient to generate
fashion cycles with intuitively appealing features, including the
observed correlation between rates of increase and decrease in
trait popularity. The model cannot, however, explain how
preferences for traits can reach high levels, and cannot explain
the observed frequency distribution of cultural traits. To address
these issues, we generalize the model to include many cultural
traits and preferences.

Neutral model and status model
We simulate a neutral model of cultural evolution that
mirrors closely existing ones [4], but allows individuals to
interact many times during their life [25] and to accumulate
cultural traits [29,30]. In this model there are no preferences for
cultural traits, hence we fix the probability of cultural transmission at com ~0:5. When an observer copies a model, she
copies a randomly chosen trait (the observer can also abandon a
trait, if the trait randomly chosen is possessed by the observer
but not by the model).
We also simulate a model of cultural transmission based on
status. Individual are endowed with an additional variable that
describes their social status (S). Cultural transmission occurs with a
constant probability com ~0:5 as in the neutral model, but the
outcome depends on the relative status of observer and model. If
Sm wSo , the observer copies from the model a randomly chosen
trait. If Sm ƒSo , the observer abandons a randomly chosen trait
possessed by both observer and model. The status of newborn
individuals is assigned randomly. We also simulated alternative
status models, either with binary status (95% of low-status
individuals and 5% ‘‘high-status’’) or varying the threshold for
abandoning or copying traits, with qualitatively similar results not
reported here.

Model 2: Many cultural traits
To describe individuals who can bear many cultural traits and
preferences, we introduce the variables qi (i~1, . . . ,n) that encode
whether the individual lacks (qi ~0) or possesses (qi ~1) any of n
traits, and by variables pi that encode the individual’s preferences
for the traits. Preferences range continuously from {1 (strong
dislike) to 1 (strong liking). Our core assumption is that an
observer’s probability to copy a cultural model is an increasing
function of how much the observer prefers the model’s traits. We
compute the overall preference of observer o for model m as

Pom ~

n
X

poi qmi

Results
The preference, neutral and status models all exhibit dynamics
in which trait frequencies change with time, and even traits that
reach high frequencies eventually disappear (Figure 4). The
preference and neutral models generate realistic frequency
distributions, while the status model appears incapable of
generating traits that persist at high frequency for a long time
(Figure 1A and Figure 5A,C,E, and Figure S5 for trait lifespan
distributions). The reason is that as soon as a trait becomes
common, high-status individuals abandon it, which in turns
triggers abandonment from low-status individuals. Thus the status
model may account for brief fads, but not for ‘‘classic’’ styles such
as the four-in-hand tie knot popular since the early 20th century
[31], or English names such as Mary and John [32].
The preference and status models exhibit correlations between
the rate of increase and decrease of traits similar to those observed
in empirical data (Figure 1B and Figure 5B,D,F). Such correlations
do not exist in the neutral model, because the frequency of a trait
at time tz1 depends solely on the frequency at time t and not on
the history of the trait. In the preference model, on the other hand,
the frequency of a trait at time tz1 depends on the frequency of
the trait at time t and on the preference value at time t (cf.
Figure 2B).
The many-trait preference model (Model 2) addresses the
main shortcoming of the model with one trait (Model 1), showing
that the preference for a trait can spread if it happens to be
associated with effective cultural models (Figure 6A). As these
individuals are copied more often than others, the preference
spreads in the population. After a preference has been
established, fashion cycles in Model 2 follow the same logic as
in Model 1. Figure 6B shows that a trait increases in frequency
when the associated preference has increased, and that the
preference starts falling as the trait becomes common (cf.
Figure 2B; see Figure S6 for examples of the preferencefrequency dynamics of individual traits). Cross-correlation
analysis of trait and preference dynamics shows that preferences
anticipate frequencies by, on average, 20% of a trait’s lifetime,
with an average cross-correlation of 0.60 (pv10{10 , t~51:51,
N~178, two-tailed one-sample t test).

ð9Þ

i~1

and we define the probability that cultural transmission occurs
from the model to the observer as
com ~

1
1ze{Pom

ð10Þ

This expression ranges from near 0, when the model has many
traits that the observer dislikes (Pom %0), to near 1, when the
model has many preferred traits (Pom &0). When the observer is
indifferent to the model’s traits (Pom ~0), the probability of
cultural transmission is com ~0:5. When an observer copies a
model, she chooses a trait-preference randomly, then copies each
member of the pair independently of the other with probability
com . Equations (9) and (10) are similar to successful models of
human decision making, such as discrete choice models in
econometry [27] and neural network models of behavior [28], in
which decisions arise from individuals attributing different weights
(preferences) to pieces of information from their environment.
Model 2 reduces to Model 1 when there is only one cultural trait
and preferences only have two values. For example, choosing 21
and 1 as possible preferences results in u~1=(1ze1 )^0:27 for the
probability that an observer without the preference copies the
model, and w~1=(1ze{1 )^0:73 for the probability that an
observer with the preference copies a model with the trait. In
Model 2 we do not need to assume a special rule for interactions
between observers with the trait, but lacking the preference, and
models with neither trait nor preference (parameter v in Model 1).
Rather, when many traits are present, those for which preferences
are low are abandoned spontaneously as a result of competition
with other traits for the opportunity of being copied.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 4. Changes of trait frequency over time in the multi-trait models of fashion. We simulate N~100 individuals interacting randomly
in discrete time steps. Cultural traits are continuously introduced with a probability mq ~0:001 per individual per time step (a new trait is introduced,
on average, every 10 time steps). Individuals may spontaneously change their preferences for existing traits, resetting them to random values
between 21 and 1 at a rate of mp ~0:001 per individual per time step. Each individual has a probability of dying of t~0:01 per time step (average
lifetime is 100 time steps). A dying individual is replaced by a naive individual who possesses no cultural traits (qi ~0, i~1, . . . ,n) and is maximally
open to learning for others (pi ~1, i~1, . . . ,n). Simulations last 20,000 time steps (only 3,000 are shown in the figure, and a maximum of 40 traits is
shown to maintain legibility).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g004

have preferences for cultural traits and individuals and that those
preferences influence the copying process [19–21]. In respect to
the status model, it suggests how social status can emerge from
cultural evolution itself. In our model, influential individuals are
those who possess many traits that others prefer and, at the same
time, have low preferences for widespread traits. This echoes the
concept of ‘‘high-status’’ in status models (high-status individuals
are copied by others, but do not themselves copy others), without

Discussion
We have shown that the social transmission of preferences for
cultural traits is sufficient to generate realistic fashion cycles,
resulting in a better fit with empirical data than the neutral and
status models of cultural change (cf. Figures 1 and 5).
Our model also overcomes theoretical shortcomings of previous
models. In respect to the neutral model, it recognizes that people
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 5. Characteristics of cultural dynamics in the multi-trait models of fashion. (A,C,E) Cumulative frequencies of traits (cf. Figure 1A for
empirical data). (B,D,F) Correlations between rates of increase and decrease of traits (cf. Figure 1B for empirical data): preference model (Pearson’s
r~0:50, pv10{10 , N~789) neutral model (Pearson’s r~{0:07, p~0:12, N~558), and status model (Pearson’s r~0:58, pv10{10 , N~871). Data
from 5 simulations with the same parameters as in Figure 4. Simulated time steps have been converted to years assuming an average lifetime of 70
years.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g005

assuming either a pre-existent social stratification or anticonformist behavior in high-status individuals. In the preference
model, moreover, an individual’s status can change if traits or
preferences in the population change.
Alternative, more elaborated, versions of the status model could
produce results different from the ones shown here, and possibly a
better fit of the empirical data. For example, it has been suggested
that individuals adopt cultural traits to signal their identity and
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

differentiate themselves from individuals of other social groups,
without necessarily implying a ‘‘vertical’’ (high/low) status hierarchy
[33,34]. Our goal here is certainly not to deny the importance of
status or identity signaling, but to show, as explained above, that at
least certain features of status-driven cultural dynamics can be
reproduced within a more parsimonious set-up.
Finally, it is worth to note that the quantity w in equation (8) can
be considered a ‘‘success index’’ akin to genetic fitness, in that it
7
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Figure 6. Dynamics of preference-trait coevolution in Model 2. (A) Initial preferences of the 10% most effective cultural models at the start of
a trait’s lifetime, for traits that will be successful (red, mean = 0.08) or unsuccessful (black, mean = 0.02, pv0:001, two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
the graph shows estimated probability densities). Traits are considered successful if they reach a frequency of at least 0.1. For successful traits, initial
preference is calculated as the average preference from the time a trait is introduced until the trait reaches 0.1 frequency. For unsuccessful traits,
initial preference is calculated as the average over the mean time required for successful traits to reach 0.1 frequency. (B) Black line: Trait frequency as
fraction of the maximum frequency. Red line: Average preference as fraction of the maximum preference. The average is computed over all traits
reaching at least a frequency of 0.1, and lasting in the population for at least 50 time steps. Time is measured as proportion of the trait’s lifetime.
Simulation parameters as in Figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032541.g006

frequency in the simplified model lies within 2% of the frequency
given by the full model.
(TIF)

allows to predict whether a trait will spread. While it is impossible
to define a generally valid success index for cultural evolution [25],
ratios similar to w may predict the success of cultural traits when
individuals have many opportunities for social learning [22,23,25].
Numerators in such ratios measure the ease with which a trait is
transmitted. Here, the difference w{u measures the advantage, as
cultural models, of individuals with the trait. More broadly,
transmissibility may relate to specific characteristics of traits that
make them easy to learn or otherwise acquire (e.g., affordable or
widely marketed clothing items), or to their psychological appeal
(resulting in what is often referred in cultural evolution literature as
content-biased transmission, see [35]), and so on. For example, it
has been shown that traits that elicit emotional reactions in general
[36], or particular emotion like disgust [37] tend to be transmitted
more than traits that do not.
On the other hand, since individuals have many occasions to
learn new traits and replace the existing ones, denominators in
indices of cultural success measure the resistance of traits in being
relinquished. Here, the difference v{u measures how easily
individuals lacking the preference abandon a trait. This suggests
that traits that are particularly memorable, useful, or otherwise
durable (e.g., tattoos) should enjoy an advantage in cultural
evolution. Here we have shown that such ratios are not only
theoretically important, but yield insight into actual cultural
processes.

Figure S2 Sample model trajectories. Sample model
trajectories in the (x0 ,g) plane of the simplified system in
equations 6–7 (Model S1), for different initial frequencies of the
preference, g(0), and initial frequency of the trait f (0)~0:05.
Trajectories start at the closed circle and end at the open diamond.
The dashed line is the line g~1{x0 , which delimits the state
space together with the lines x0 ~0 and g~0. The red line is the
locus of all starting conditions with f (0)~0:05 (assuming the trait
and the preference are initially distributed independently). The
dotted lines are trajectories of the full system, equations 1–4 in the
main text, showing the quality of our approximation.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Equilibrium values of preferences. Frequency
of the preference for a trait at the end of a fashion cycle
(x?P ~1{x?0 in equation 15 (Model S1) as a function of initial
frequency of the preference, g(0). All parameters as in Figure S2.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Maximum frequency attained during a trait’s
fashion cycle. Maximum frequency attained during a trait’s
fashion cycle, as a function of initial preference, g(0), and system
parameters, w. Initial frequency is f (0)~:0:05.
(TIF)

Supporting Information
Model S1

Distribution of trait lifespans in the multitrait models of fashion. Distribution of trait lifespans for the
preference, status and neutral models for the simulations described
in the main text.
(TIF)

Figure S5

Derivation and analysis of Model 1.

(PDF)
Figure S1 Goodness of simplified model. Absolute difference between trait frequency (f ~xT zxPT ) according to the full
Model 1 (equations 1–4 in the main text) and the simplified model
in equations (6,7,9) as a function of initial preference, g(0), and for
different combinations of v and w parameters (u~1). Trait
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

Figure S6 Examples of frequency-preference dynamics
in simulations of the multi-trait preference model. (A)
The preference (red) for a trait rises in the population, which
8
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individuals such as George Washington, George Harrison, or
George Clooney.
(TIF)

causes a rise in frequency (blue). As the trait becomes common, the
preference falls and eventually the trait declines in frequency. See
main text for discussion. (B) Another example of the same
dynamics, showing that the latency between rise in preference and
rise in frequency may be long. (C) A trait undergoing multiple
fashion cycles. Trait revival is possible by either chance fluctuation
or because effective models adopt the trait again. (D) A trait that
remains popular for some time, despite not being preferred. This
may happen because a common trait is likely to be possessed by
successful cultural models, hence it can be copied even if it does
not contribute to the model’s success. A real-life example may be
common names such as George, who may not be perceived as
particularly catchy but is nevertheless associated with successful

Table S1 Model 1 transitions.

(PDF)
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